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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
CPLR 3212(e): Partialsummary judgment denied in personal injury
action.
Since the landmark decision of Di Sabata v. Soffes, 94 plaintiffs in
personal injury actions have been permitted to avail themselves of the
expeditious remedy of summary judgment. Although this much is clear,
a new obstacle has arisen. In Enker v. Slattery Construction Co.,95 the
Appellate Division, Second Department, denied plaintiff's motion for
partial summary judgment 6 on the issue of defendant's negligence since
it was conceded that plaintiff's freedom from contributory negligence
was still in issue. The court reasoned that the negligence issues were so
intertwined that even if partial summary judgment were granted, a consideration of defendant's negligence would of necessity be involved in
a determination of plaintiff's contributory negligence.
If the defendant's negligence is so closely related to plaintiff's
contributory negligence that the issues would reappear notwithstanding
partial summary judgment, then the Enker result is sound. Indeed, in
this instance, the issue sought to be summarily resolved is still disputable and cannot be determined as a matter of law. 97 Nonetheless, it
should not be presumed that Enker has dosed the door to 3212(e)
relief in personal injury actions. Rather, each case should be determined on an ad hoc basis. As a practical matter, the application of
CPLR 3212(e) in personal injury actions would greatly relieve the
court's congested calendar.
CPLR 3213: Bank and mortgage instrument deemed not to constitute
an instrument for the payment of money only.
A motion under CPLR 3213 for summary judgment in lieu of
complaint is potentially an expeditious means of arriving at judgment.
However, there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding which "presumptively meritorious" claims will fall within a particular court's
conception of an "instrument for payment of money only." This
dilemma is attributable to two factors: first, the "motion-action"9 83 did
not exist prior to the CPLR and consequently there is a lack of
94 9 App. Div. 2d 297, 193 N.Y.S.2d 184 (Ist Dep't 1959).
95 34 App. Div. 2d 673, 310 N.Y.S.2d 729 (2d Dep't 1970).
96 CPLR 3212(e) provides that "summary judgment may be granted as to one or
more causes of action, or part thereof, in favor of one or more parties, to the extent warranted, on such terms as may be just."
97 CPLR 3212(b).
98 Because an action under CPLR 3213 can be prosecuted with the facility of a mo.
tion, it has been styled a "motion-action." See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3213, commentary

1 at 829 (1970).
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definitive precedent to guide the courts, 99 and, second, there is an
apparent conflict between the revisors' intendment and the statute as
finally enacted. 100
A recent example of the confusion generated by CPLR 3213 is
provided by New York Conference Association of 7th Day Adventists v.
915 James Street Associates, Ltd.1° 1 Plaintiff, suing under an acceleration clause of a bond and mortgage, proved the instrument and defendant's default; defendant did not offer any defense on the merits of the
claim, but merely contended that the bond and mortgage did not constitute an instrument for the payment of money only. The court accepted defendant's objection, pointing out the number of conditions
written into the instrument.
Although there were a number of obligations imposed on the
defendant, 10 2 this does not alter the fact that plaintiff's prima facie
case consisted of proof of the instrument and a failure to make the
payments called for by its terms. 10 3 Thus, if any of the conditions were
serious enough to defeat recovery, it would be an appropriate opportunity for a disposition on the merits. Unfortunately, however, the

disparity arising from the interpretation of GPLR.3213 has progressed
to a point where there is ample authority to support either a liberal'0 4
or restrictive' 0 5 approach to a given area. Admittedly, doubts at the
preliminary stages of litigation should be resolved in favor of the defendant. Nevertheless, the judiciary's refusal to recognize even straightforward claims may compel the practitioner to ignore the machinery

established by CPLR 3213 and prosecute his presumptively meritorious
claims via the longer but surer procedure found in CPLR 3212.
99 Additionally, legislative documents do not go far in amplifying the intent behind
the phrase "instrument for the payment of money only." See Frss REP. 91; FirrH RE'.
492; Sm-XTREP. 338.
100 The revisors intended a speedy method for adjudicating claims "presumptively
meritorious." See Fmsr Rm. 91; 4 WK&M
3213.01. Nevertheless, the statute contains the
precise requirement of a "money only" instrument.
10163 Misc. 2d 38, 310 N.Y.S.2d 742 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1970).
102 If the mere existence of collateral obligations were enough to defeat a 3213 mo.
tion, then only a negotiable instrument would be sustained for 3213 use. 7B McKINNEY'S
CPLR 3213, supp. commentary 4 at 831 (1970).
103 See Seaman-Andwall Corp. v. Wright Mach. Corp., 31 App. Div. 2d 136, 295 N.Y.S.
2d 752 (1st Dep't 1968).
104 See, e.g., id.; Wagner v. Cornblum, 62 Misc. 2d 161, 308 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct.
Erie County 1970); Mike Nasti Sand Co. v. Almar Landscaping Corp., 57 Misc. 2d 550,
293 N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1968); Baker v. Gundermann, 52 Misc. 2d 639,
276 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966).
105 See, e.g., Signal Plan v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 23 App. Div. 2d 636, 256 N.Y.S.2d
866 (1st Dep't 1965); Orenstein v. Orenstein, 59 Misc. 2d 565, 299 N.Y.S.2d 648 (App. T.
2d Dep't 1969); All-O-Matic Mfg. Corp. v. Shields, 59 Misc. 2d 199, 298 N.Y.S.2d 268 (Dist.
Ct, Nassau County 1969).

